In In re Town Center Flats LLC,[1] the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the extent of a debtor’s interest in an assigned stream of rents.
Sites Committee
Committees
Section 727(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the discharge of debts that arose prior to the petition date.
The U.S. Supreme Court has, for four decades, been rocking the boat [that’s Justice Blackmun’s metaphor] on bankruptcy court authority. First, they almost killed the Code, coming within one vote of declaring the entire Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional. Then, they limit and mess with it some more.
Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides that an individual debtor’s debt is not discharged to the extent the debt was obtained by use of a statement in writing that (1) is materially false, (2) is respecting the debtor’s financial condition, (3) is one on which the creditor reasonably relied and (4) was caused by the debtor to be made or published with intent to deceive. Recently, in Privitera v.
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Secure Leverage put to bed nearly five years of litigation on the question of what contracts are sufficiently “similar to” futures contracts under § 761(4) of the Bankruptcy Code to receive the highest priority of repayment in a commodity broker liquidation.[1] The court held that in or
Part I of this article identified several important issues that arise when crowdfunded companies file for bankruptcy. Among the most foreseeable dilemmas is that only a handful of crowdfunding backers would file a proof of claim, allowing equity-holders to recover an unduly high share of the debtor’s assets.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 2015 and explicitly adopted the concept of proportionality:
Statements made during mediation are privileged and confidential — right? In the context of federal bankruptcy proceedings, the answer is not so simple. Some practitioners will be surprised to learn that there is no such thing as a federal “mediation privilege.” The mediation privileges that most practitioners are familiar with are actually creatures of state law.
After a bankruptcy case closed, a third party (CVC) sued the purchaser (ADM) of property acquired from the debtors in a bankruptcy sale. CVC claimed that it had a right of first refusal (ROFR) with respect to the property. In response, ADM contended that the ROFR did not survive the “free and clear” bankruptcy sale.
What happens when property of the estate that a trustee or debtor-in-possession proposes to sell “free and clear” is subject to unexpired lease interests? The resolution of this question requires the reconciliation of two separate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that most often operate independently and in isolation. The first provision, 11 U.S.C.
